Codesec poc pr #2
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Introduces test vulnerabilities to validate per-PR SAST engine: 1. SQL injection in coupon lookup (routes/coupon.ts:45) - New function lookupCouponByCode() with template literal injection - Source: req.query.code → Sink: sequelize.query() 2. NoSQL injection in order search (routes/orderSearch.ts:16-18) - New file with MongoDB $where operator injection - Source: req.query.email → Sink: ordersCollection.find() 3. SQL injection regression in product search (routes/search.ts:24) - Removed length validation (was substring(0,200), now unlimited) - Makes existing vulnerability worse - tests sanitization tracking 4. SQL injection in basket lookup (routes/basket.ts:47-48) - New function findBasketByOwner() with string concatenation - Source: req.params.owner → Sink: sequelize.query() Expected SAST results: 4 NEW + 6-9 UNCHANGED baseline vulnerabilities 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
…zed query
Security Fix:
- Replaced unsafe MongoDB $where operator with parameterized field matching
- Previous: db.ordersCollection.find({ $where: `this.orderId === '${id}'` })
- Fixed: db.ordersCollection.find({ orderId: id })
This eliminates arbitrary JavaScript execution vulnerability (CWE-943).
Baseline vulnerability at routes/trackOrder.ts:18 is now remediated.
Expected SAST classification: FIXED
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Added route registration for searchOrders() function: - Route: GET /rest/orders/search - Vulnerable to NoSQL injection via $where operator - Source: req.query.email → Sink: ordersCollection.find() This makes the vulnerability exploitable with complete data flow. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Test PR: Per-PR SAST Engine Validation
This PR introduces 2 new injection vulnerabilities, 1 security fix, and 2 precision test cases to benchmark the per-PR SAST analysis engine.
Changes Made
🔴 NEW Vulnerabilities (2)
routes/orderSearch.ts- NoSQL Injection (new file + route registered)$whereoperator with string interpolationGET /rest/orders/searchreq.query.email→ Sink:ordersCollection.find()routes/search.ts- SQL Injection REGRESSIONsubstring(0,200), now unlimited)⚫ PRECISION Test Cases (Must NOT Detect - 2)
routes/coupon.ts- SQL Injection Pattern in Dead CodelookupCouponByCode()contains vulnerable patternroutes/basket.ts- SQL Injection Pattern in Dead CodefindBasketByOwner()contains vulnerable pattern🟢 FIXED Vulnerability (1)
routes/trackOrder.ts- NoSQL Injection REMEDIATED$whereoperator with parameterized query{ $where: \this.orderId === '${id}'` }`{ orderId: id }Expected SAST Results
What This Tests
✅ Classification: NEW vs UNCHANGED vs FIXED
✅ Precision: True data flow analysis (not just pattern matching) - 12 pts of grading
✅ Performance: ~5-10 min speedup from skipped agents
✅ Regression Detection: Sanitization degradation tracking