From 94fe2c25a2f40f1aa41fe279ce650ad37c5be904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:37:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] xsk: check IFF_UP earlier in Tx path jira VULN-154576 cve CVE-2023-53240 commit-author Maciej Fijalkowski commit 1596dae2f17ec5c6e8c8f0e3fec78c5ae55c1e0b Xsk Tx can be triggered via either sendmsg() or poll() syscalls. These two paths share a call to common function xsk_xmit() which has two sanity checks within. A pseudo code example to show the two paths: __xsk_sendmsg() : xsk_poll(): if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) return -ENXIO; return mask; if (unlikely(need_wait)) (...) return -EOPNOTSUPP; xsk_xmit() mark napi id (...) xsk_xmit() xsk_xmit(): if (unlikely(!(xs->dev->flags & IFF_UP))) return -ENETDOWN; if (unlikely(!xs->tx)) return -ENOBUFS; As it can be observed above, in sendmsg() napi id can be marked on interface that was not brought up and this causes a NULL ptr dereference: [31757.505631] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 [31757.512710] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [31757.517936] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [31757.523149] PGD 0 P4D 0 [31757.525726] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [31757.530154] CPU: 26 PID: 95641 Comm: xdpsock Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5+ #40 [31757.536871] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [31757.547457] RIP: 0010:xsk_sendmsg+0xde/0x180 [31757.551799] Code: 00 75 a2 48 8b 00 a8 04 75 9b 84 d2 74 69 8b 85 14 01 00 00 85 c0 75 1b 48 8b 85 28 03 00 00 48 8b 80 98 00 00 00 48 8b 40 20 <8b> 40 18 89 85 14 01 00 00 8b bd 14 01 00 00 81 ff 00 01 00 00 0f [31757.570840] RSP: 0018:ffffc90034f27dc0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [31757.576143] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90034f27e18 RCX: 0000000000000000 [31757.583389] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffc90034f27e18 RDI: ffff88984cf3c100 [31757.590631] RBP: ffff88984714a800 R08: ffff88984714a800 R09: 0000000000000000 [31757.597877] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffffa [31757.605123] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [31757.612364] FS: 00007fb4c5931180(0000) GS:ffff88afdfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [31757.620571] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [31757.626406] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000184b41c003 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [31757.633648] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [31757.640894] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [31757.648139] PKRU: 55555554 [31757.650894] Call Trace: [31757.653385] [31757.655524] sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xa0 [31757.659077] ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x70 [31757.663416] __sys_sendto+0xfc/0x170 [31757.667051] ? do_sched_setscheduler+0xdb/0x1b0 [31757.671658] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 [31757.675557] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [31757.679197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [31757.687969] Code: 8e f6 ff 44 8b 4c 24 2c 4c 8b 44 24 20 41 89 c4 44 8b 54 24 28 48 8b 54 24 18 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 74 24 10 8b 7c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 3a 44 89 e7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 b5 8e f6 ff 48 [31757.707007] RSP: 002b:00007ffd49c73c70 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [31757.714694] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a996565380 RCX: 00007fb4c5727c16 [31757.721939] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [31757.729184] RBP: 0000000000000040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [31757.736429] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 [31757.743673] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [31757.754940] To fix this, let's make xsk_xmit a function that will be responsible for generic Tx, where RCU is handled accordingly and pull out sanity checks and xs->zc handling. Populate sanity checks to __xsk_sendmsg() and xsk_poll(). Fixes: ca2e1a627035 ("xsk: Mark napi_id on sendmsg()") Fixes: 18b1ab7aa76b ("xsk: Fix race at socket teardown") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230215143309.13145-1-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann (cherry picked from commit 1596dae2f17ec5c6e8c8f0e3fec78c5ae55c1e0b) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/xdp/xsk.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk.c b/net/xdp/xsk.c index 9f0561b67c12e..13f62d2402e71 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk.c +++ b/net/xdp/xsk.c @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *xsk_build_skb(struct xdp_sock *xs, return skb; } -static int xsk_generic_xmit(struct sock *sk) +static int __xsk_generic_xmit(struct sock *sk) { struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(sk); u32 max_batch = TX_BATCH_SIZE; @@ -594,22 +594,13 @@ static int xsk_generic_xmit(struct sock *sk) return err; } -static int xsk_xmit(struct sock *sk) +static int xsk_generic_xmit(struct sock *sk) { - struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(sk); int ret; - if (unlikely(!(xs->dev->flags & IFF_UP))) - return -ENETDOWN; - if (unlikely(!xs->tx)) - return -ENOBUFS; - - if (xs->zc) - return xsk_wakeup(xs, XDP_WAKEUP_TX); - /* Drop the RCU lock since the SKB path might sleep. */ rcu_read_unlock(); - ret = xsk_generic_xmit(sk); + ret = __xsk_generic_xmit(sk); /* Reaquire RCU lock before going into common code. */ rcu_read_lock(); @@ -627,17 +618,31 @@ static bool xsk_no_wakeup(struct sock *sk) #endif } +static int xsk_check_common(struct xdp_sock *xs) +{ + if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) + return -ENXIO; + if (unlikely(!(xs->dev->flags & IFF_UP))) + return -ENETDOWN; + + return 0; +} + static int __xsk_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len) { bool need_wait = !(m->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(sk); struct xsk_buff_pool *pool; + int err; - if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) - return -ENXIO; + err = xsk_check_common(xs); + if (err) + return err; if (unlikely(need_wait)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (unlikely(!xs->tx)) + return -ENOBUFS; if (sk_can_busy_loop(sk)) { if (xs->zc) @@ -649,8 +654,11 @@ static int __xsk_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len return 0; pool = xs->pool; - if (pool->cached_need_wakeup & XDP_WAKEUP_TX) - return xsk_xmit(sk); + if (pool->cached_need_wakeup & XDP_WAKEUP_TX) { + if (xs->zc) + return xsk_wakeup(xs, XDP_WAKEUP_TX); + return xsk_generic_xmit(sk); + } return 0; } @@ -670,11 +678,11 @@ static int __xsk_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int bool need_wait = !(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(sk); + int err; - if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) - return -ENXIO; - if (unlikely(!(xs->dev->flags & IFF_UP))) - return -ENETDOWN; + err = xsk_check_common(xs); + if (err) + return err; if (unlikely(!xs->rx)) return -ENOBUFS; if (unlikely(need_wait)) @@ -713,21 +721,20 @@ static __poll_t xsk_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait); rcu_read_lock(); - if (unlikely(!xsk_is_bound(xs))) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - return mask; - } + if (xsk_check_common(xs)) + goto skip_tx; pool = xs->pool; if (pool->cached_need_wakeup) { if (xs->zc) xsk_wakeup(xs, pool->cached_need_wakeup); - else + else if (xs->tx) /* Poll needs to drive Tx also in copy mode */ - xsk_xmit(sk); + xsk_generic_xmit(sk); } +skip_tx: if (xs->rx && !xskq_prod_is_empty(xs->rx)) mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; if (xs->tx && xsk_tx_writeable(xs)) From e48f97e98006383e959b69d9dfcc99e674459577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:37:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] drm/i915: mark requests for GuC virtual engines to avoid use-after-free jira VULN-157599 cve CVE-2023-53552 commit-author Andrzej Hajda commit 5eefc5307c983b59344a4cb89009819f580c84fa References to i915_requests may be trapped by userspace inside a sync_file or dmabuf (dma-resv) and held indefinitely across different proceses. To counter-act the memory leaks, we try to not to keep references from the request past their completion. On the other side on fence release we need to know if rq->engine is valid and points to hw engine (true for non-virtual requests). To make it possible extra bit has been added to rq->execution_mask, for marking virtual engines. Fixes: bcb9aa45d5a0 ("Revert "drm/i915: Hold reference to intel_context over life of i915_request"") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230821153035.3903006-1-andrzej.hajda@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 280410677af763f3871b93e794a199cfcf6fb580) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi (cherry picked from commit 5eefc5307c983b59344a4cb89009819f580c84fa) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_types.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c | 3 +++ drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_request.c | 7 ++----- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_types.h index 6b5d4ea22b673..107f465a27b9e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_types.h @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct intel_breadcrumbs; typedef u32 intel_engine_mask_t; #define ALL_ENGINES ((intel_engine_mask_t)~0ul) +#define VIRTUAL_ENGINES BIT(BITS_PER_TYPE(intel_engine_mask_t) - 1) struct intel_hw_status_page { struct list_head timelines; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c index 844dee09a3216..b8df8da85b519 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c @@ -5202,6 +5202,9 @@ guc_create_virtual(struct intel_engine_cs **siblings, unsigned int count, ve->base.flags = I915_ENGINE_IS_VIRTUAL; + BUILD_BUG_ON(ilog2(VIRTUAL_ENGINES) < I915_NUM_ENGINES); + ve->base.mask = VIRTUAL_ENGINES; + intel_context_init(&ve->context, &ve->base); for (n = 0; n < count; n++) { diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_request.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_request.c index f949a9495758a..be132ce651154 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_request.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_request.c @@ -134,9 +134,7 @@ static void i915_fence_release(struct dma_fence *fence) i915_sw_fence_fini(&rq->semaphore); /* - * Keep one request on each engine for reserved use under mempressure - * do not use with virtual engines as this really is only needed for - * kernel contexts. + * Keep one request on each engine for reserved use under mempressure. * * We do not hold a reference to the engine here and so have to be * very careful in what rq->engine we poke. The virtual engine is @@ -166,8 +164,7 @@ static void i915_fence_release(struct dma_fence *fence) * know that if the rq->execution_mask is a single bit, rq->engine * can be a physical engine with the exact corresponding mask. */ - if (!intel_engine_is_virtual(rq->engine) && - is_power_of_2(rq->execution_mask) && + if (is_power_of_2(rq->execution_mask) && !cmpxchg(&rq->engine->request_pool, NULL, rq)) return; From 06190cd7afc4048b1a3cf8924e63911f0d4efc94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:37:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] net/mlx5e: Check for NOT_READY flag state after locking jira VULN-157713 cve CVE-2023-53581 commit-author Vlad Buslov commit 65e64640e97c0f223e77f9ea69b5a46186b93470 Currently the check for NOT_READY flag is performed before obtaining the necessary lock. This opens a possibility for race condition when the flow is concurrently removed from unready_flows list by the workqueue task, which causes a double-removal from the list and a crash[0]. Fix the issue by moving the flag check inside the section protected by uplink_priv->unready_flows_lock mutex. [0]: [44376.389654] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] SMP [44376.391665] CPU: 7 PID: 59123 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.4.0-rc4+ #1 [44376.392984] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [44376.395342] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core] [44376.396857] Code: 00 48 8b b8 68 ce 02 00 e8 8a 4d 02 00 4c 8d a8 a8 01 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 8b 79 88 e1 48 8b 83 98 06 00 00 48 8b 93 90 06 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 89 83 90 06 [44376.399167] RSP: 0018:ffff88812cc97570 EFLAGS: 00010246 [44376.399680] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff8881088e3800 RCX: ffff8881881bac00 [44376.400337] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff88812cc97500 RDI: ffff8881242f71b0 [44376.401001] RBP: ffff88811cbb0940 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 [44376.401663] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88812c944000 [44376.402342] R13: ffff8881242f71a8 R14: ffff8881222b4000 R15: 0000000000000000 [44376.402999] FS: 00007f0451104800(0000) GS:ffff88852cb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [44376.403787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [44376.404343] CR2: 0000000000489108 CR3: 0000000123a79003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0 [44376.405004] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [44376.405665] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [44376.406339] Call Trace: [44376.406651] [44376.406939] ? die_addr+0x33/0x90 [44376.407311] ? exc_general_protection+0x192/0x390 [44376.407795] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 [44376.408292] ? mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core] [44376.408876] __mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peer_flow+0xbc/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [44376.409482] mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x42/0x210 [mlx5_core] [44376.410055] mlx5e_flow_put+0x25/0x50 [mlx5_core] [44376.410529] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x24b/0x350 [mlx5_core] [44376.411043] tc_setup_cb_reoffload+0x22/0x80 [44376.411462] fl_reoffload+0x261/0x2f0 [cls_flower] [44376.411907] ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_ft_cb+0x160/0x160 [mlx5_core] [44376.412481] ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_ft_cb+0x160/0x160 [mlx5_core] [44376.413044] tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x76/0x170 [44376.413497] tcf_block_unbind+0x7b/0xd0 [44376.413881] tcf_block_setup+0x17d/0x1c0 [44376.414269] tcf_block_offload_cmd.isra.0+0xf1/0x130 [44376.414725] tcf_block_offload_unbind+0x43/0x70 [44376.415153] __tcf_block_put+0x82/0x150 [44376.415532] ingress_destroy+0x22/0x30 [sch_ingress] [44376.415986] qdisc_destroy+0x3b/0xd0 [44376.416343] qdisc_graft+0x4d0/0x620 [44376.416706] tc_get_qdisc+0x1c9/0x3b0 [44376.417074] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x29c/0x390 [44376.419978] ? rep_movs_alternative+0x3a/0xa0 [44376.420399] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x120/0x120 [44376.420813] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 [44376.421192] netlink_unicast+0x1f6/0x2c0 [44376.421573] netlink_sendmsg+0x232/0x4a0 [44376.421980] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 [44376.422328] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x1e0 [44376.422709] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 [44376.423127] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 [44376.423495] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8b/0xc0 [44376.423869] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [44376.424226] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [44376.424587] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [44376.425046] RIP: 0033:0x7f045134f887 [44376.425403] Code: 0a 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 [44376.426914] RSP: 002b:00007ffd63a82b98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [44376.427592] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000006481955f RCX: 00007f045134f887 [44376.428195] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd63a82c00 RDI: 0000000000000003 [44376.428796] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [44376.429404] R10: 00007f0451208708 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [44376.430039] R13: 0000000000409980 R14: 000000000047e538 R15: 0000000000485400 [44376.430644] [44376.430907] Modules linked in: mlx5_ib mlx5_core act_mirred act_tunnel_key cls_flower vxlan dummy sch_ingress openvswitch nsh rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_g ss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] [44376.433936] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [44376.434373] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core] [44376.434951] Code: 00 48 8b b8 68 ce 02 00 e8 8a 4d 02 00 4c 8d a8 a8 01 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 8b 79 88 e1 48 8b 83 98 06 00 00 48 8b 93 90 06 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 89 83 90 06 [44376.436452] RSP: 0018:ffff88812cc97570 EFLAGS: 00010246 [44376.436924] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff8881088e3800 RCX: ffff8881881bac00 [44376.437530] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff88812cc97500 RDI: ffff8881242f71b0 [44376.438179] RBP: ffff88811cbb0940 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 [44376.438786] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88812c944000 [44376.439393] R13: ffff8881242f71a8 R14: ffff8881222b4000 R15: 0000000000000000 [44376.439998] FS: 00007f0451104800(0000) GS:ffff88852cb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [44376.440714] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [44376.441225] CR2: 0000000000489108 CR3: 0000000123a79003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0 [44376.441843] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [44376.442471] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: ad86755b18d5 ("net/mlx5e: Protect unready flows with dedicated lock") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed (cherry picked from commit 65e64640e97c0f223e77f9ea69b5a46186b93470) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c index d1568f61ebd81..b0ba4649fc0f9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c @@ -1561,7 +1561,8 @@ static void remove_unready_flow(struct mlx5e_tc_flow *flow) uplink_priv = &rpriv->uplink_priv; mutex_lock(&uplink_priv->unready_flows_lock); - unready_flow_del(flow); + if (flow_flag_test(flow, NOT_READY)) + unready_flow_del(flow); mutex_unlock(&uplink_priv->unready_flows_lock); } @@ -1973,8 +1974,7 @@ static void mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, esw_attr = attr->esw_attr; mlx5e_put_flow_tunnel_id(flow); - if (flow_flag_test(flow, NOT_READY)) - remove_unready_flow(flow); + remove_unready_flow(flow); if (mlx5e_is_offloaded_flow(flow)) { if (flow_flag_test(flow, SLOW)) From 3f2cc7309837e72192ba2c1db9ca9cf6b163e096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:37:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] ipv6: Fix out-of-bounds access in ipv6_find_tlv() jira VULN-159018 cve CVE-2023-53705 commit-author Gavrilov Ilia commit 878ecb0897f4737a4c9401f3523fd49589025671 optlen is fetched without checking whether there is more than one byte to parse. It can lead to out-of-bounds access. Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: c61a40432509 ("[IPV6]: Find option offset by type.") Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller (cherry picked from commit 878ecb0897f4737a4c9401f3523fd49589025671) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/ipv6/exthdrs_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs_core.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs_core.c index da46c42846765..49e31e4ae7b7f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs_core.c +++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs_core.c @@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ int ipv6_find_tlv(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int type) optlen = 1; break; default: + if (len < 2) + goto bad; optlen = nh[offset + 1] + 2; if (optlen > len) goto bad; From 8fce84b957513f48446200e754789867906c424d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:37:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] sctp: detect and prevent references to a freed transport in sendmsg MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit jira VULN-66665 cve CVE-2025-23142 commit-author Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro commit f1a69a940de58b16e8249dff26f74c8cc59b32be sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in all the message chunks to be sent. There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have been set up and before the message is sent. This can happen if the send buffer is full, during the period when the sender thread temporarily releases the socket lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). This causes the access to the transport data in sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association outqueue is flushed, to result in a use-after-free read. This change avoids this scenario by having sctp_transport_free() signal the freeing of the transport, tagging it as "dead". In order to do this, the patch restores the "dead" bit in struct sctp_transport, which was removed in commit 47faa1e4c50e ("sctp: remove the dead field of sctp_transport"). Then, in the scenario where the sender thread has released the socket lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(), the bit is checked again after re-acquiring the socket lock to detect the deletion. This is done while holding a reference to the transport to prevent it from being freed in the process. If the transport was deleted while the socket lock was relinquished, sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() will return -EAGAIN to let userspace retry the send. The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1] and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]). Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport.txt [1] Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-free_Read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__repro.c [2] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: df132eff4638 ("sctp: clear the transport of some out_chunk_list chunks in sctp_assoc_rm_peer") Suggested-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro Acked-by: Xin Long Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404-kasan_slab-use-after-free_read_in_sctp_outq_select_transport__20250404-v1-1-5ce4a0b78ef2@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni (cherry picked from commit f1a69a940de58b16e8249dff26f74c8cc59b32be) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 3 ++- net/sctp/socket.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- net/sctp/transport.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h index 350f250b0dc75..a20a3b62c4acd 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h @@ -777,6 +777,7 @@ struct sctp_transport { /* Reference counting. */ refcount_t refcnt; + __u32 dead:1, /* RTO-Pending : A flag used to track if one of the DATA * chunks sent to this address is currently being * used to compute a RTT. If this flag is 0, @@ -786,7 +787,7 @@ struct sctp_transport { * calculation completes (i.e. the DATA chunk * is SACK'd) clear this flag. */ - __u32 rto_pending:1, + rto_pending:1, /* * hb_sent : a flag that signals that we have a pending diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index e36fe77f29755..caec5534d0953 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ /* Forward declarations for internal helper functions. */ static bool sctp_writeable(struct sock *sk); static void sctp_wfree(struct sk_buff *skb); -static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, - size_t msg_len); +static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sctp_transport *transport, + long *timeo_p, size_t msg_len); static int sctp_wait_for_packet(struct sock *sk, int *err, long *timeo_p); static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *, long *timeo_p); static int sctp_wait_for_accept(struct sock *sk, long timeo); @@ -1826,7 +1827,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, if (sctp_wspace(asoc) <= 0 || !sk_wmem_schedule(sk, msg_len)) { timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); - err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len); + err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, transport, &timeo, msg_len); if (err) goto err; } @@ -9172,8 +9173,9 @@ void sctp_sock_rfree(struct sk_buff *skb) /* Helper function to wait for space in the sndbuf. */ -static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, - size_t msg_len) +static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sctp_transport *transport, + long *timeo_p, size_t msg_len) { struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; long current_timeo = *timeo_p; @@ -9183,7 +9185,9 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld, msg_len:%zu\n", __func__, asoc, *timeo_p, msg_len); - /* Increment the association's refcnt. */ + /* Increment the transport and association's refcnt. */ + if (transport) + sctp_transport_hold(transport); sctp_association_hold(asoc); /* Wait on the association specific sndbuf space. */ @@ -9192,7 +9196,7 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (asoc->base.dead) goto do_dead; - if (!*timeo_p) + if ((!*timeo_p) || (transport && transport->dead)) goto do_nonblock; if (sk->sk_err || asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) goto do_error; @@ -9217,7 +9221,9 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, out: finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait); - /* Release the association's refcnt. */ + /* Release the transport and association's refcnt. */ + if (transport) + sctp_transport_put(transport); sctp_association_put(asoc); return err; diff --git a/net/sctp/transport.c b/net/sctp/transport.c index b3f1a91e9a079..859bc0239b234 100644 --- a/net/sctp/transport.c +++ b/net/sctp/transport.c @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ struct sctp_transport *sctp_transport_new(struct net *net, */ void sctp_transport_free(struct sctp_transport *transport) { + transport->dead = 1; + /* Try to delete the heartbeat timer. */ if (del_timer(&transport->hb_timer)) sctp_transport_put(transport); From eb3645cdcdfadf198d6765bfa8c44b6d9514f2ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:37:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] KVM: arm64: Tear down vGIC on failed vCPU creation jira VULN-67833 cve CVE-2025-37849 commit-author Will Deacon commit 250f25367b58d8c65a1b060a2dda037eea09a672 If kvm_arch_vcpu_create() fails to share the vCPU page with the hypervisor, we propagate the error back to the ioctl but leave the vGIC vCPU data initialised. Note only does this leak the corresponding memory when the vCPU is destroyed but it can also lead to use-after-free if the redistributor device handling tries to walk into the vCPU. Add the missing cleanup to kvm_arch_vcpu_create(), ensuring that the vGIC vCPU structures are destroyed on error. Cc: Cc: Marc Zyngier Cc: Oliver Upton Cc: Quentin Perret Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250314133409.9123-1-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton (cherry picked from commit 250f25367b58d8c65a1b060a2dda037eea09a672) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index 917086be5c6b1..c6548ba40024c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -351,7 +351,11 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (err) return err; - return kvm_share_hyp(vcpu, vcpu + 1); + err = kvm_share_hyp(vcpu, vcpu + 1); + if (err) + kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(vcpu); + + return err; } void kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) From eb1bbc688266f59f54d5b3eaeeed8353a94689b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:38:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible UAF on iso_conn_free jira VULN-160178 cve CVE-2025-40141 commit-author Luiz Augusto von Dentz commit 9950f095d6c875dbe0c9ebfcf972ec88fdf26fc8 This attempt to fix similar issue to sco_conn_free where if the conn->sk is not set to NULL may lead to UAF on iso_conn_free. Fixes: ccf74f2390d6 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz (cherry picked from commit 9950f095d6c875dbe0c9ebfcf972ec88fdf26fc8) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index f825857db6d0b..3719b6e9857b6 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -557,6 +557,13 @@ static void iso_sock_kill(struct sock *sk) BT_DBG("sk %p state %d", sk, sk->sk_state); + /* Sock is dead, so set conn->sk to NULL to avoid possible UAF */ + if (iso_pi(sk)->conn) { + iso_conn_lock(iso_pi(sk)->conn); + iso_pi(sk)->conn->sk = NULL; + iso_conn_unlock(iso_pi(sk)->conn); + } + /* Kill poor orphan */ bt_sock_unlink(&iso_sk_list, sk); sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD); From cdf1fa8a9b1768a635320384ed14732cda5697b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:38:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Fix invalid quirk input mapping jira VULN-160203 cve CVE-2025-40154 commit-author Takashi Iwai commit fba404e4b4af4f4f747bb0e41e9fff7d03c7bcc0 When an invalid value is passed via quirk option, currently bytcr_rt5640 driver only shows an error message but leaves as is. This may lead to unepxected results like OOB access. This patch corrects the input mapping to the certain default value if an invalid value is passed. Fixes: 063422ca2a9d ("ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Set card long_name based on quirks") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Message-ID: <20250902171826.27329-3-tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown (cherry picked from commit fba404e4b4af4f4f747bb0e41e9fff7d03c7bcc0) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c b/sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c index fb9d9e271845d..32f27bf0e6822 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c @@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ enum { BYT_RT5640_OVCD_SF_1P5 = (RT5640_OVCD_SF_1P5 << 13), }; -#define BYT_RT5640_MAP(quirk) ((quirk) & GENMASK(3, 0)) +#define BYT_RT5640_MAP_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) +#define BYT_RT5640_MAP(quirk) ((quirk) & BYT_RT5640_MAP_MASK) #define BYT_RT5640_JDSRC(quirk) (((quirk) & GENMASK(7, 4)) >> 4) #define BYT_RT5640_OVCD_TH(quirk) (((quirk) & GENMASK(12, 8)) >> 8) #define BYT_RT5640_OVCD_SF(quirk) (((quirk) & GENMASK(14, 13)) >> 13) @@ -136,7 +137,9 @@ static void log_quirks(struct device *dev) dev_info(dev, "quirk NO_INTERNAL_MIC_MAP enabled\n"); break; default: - dev_err(dev, "quirk map 0x%x is not supported, microphone input will not work\n", map); + dev_warn_once(dev, "quirk sets invalid input map: 0x%x, default to DMIC1_MAP\n", map); + byt_rt5640_quirk &= ~BYT_RT5640_MAP_MASK; + byt_rt5640_quirk |= BYT_RT5640_DMIC1_MAP; break; } if (byt_rt5640_quirk & BYT_RT5640_HSMIC2_ON_IN1) From a83da2151009af2334c8ea09b6900bc0e007eef8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shreeya Patel Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 10:38:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size against SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE jira VULN-161156 cve CVE-2025-40277 commit-author Ian Forbes commit 32b415a9dc2c212e809b7ebc2b14bc3fbda2b9af This data originates from userspace and is used in buffer offset calculations which could potentially overflow causing an out-of-bounds access. Fixes: 8ce75f8ab904 ("drm/vmwgfx: Update device includes for DX device functionality") Reported-by: Rohit Keshri Signed-off-by: Ian Forbes Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251021190128.13014-1-ian.forbes@broadcom.com (cherry picked from commit 32b415a9dc2c212e809b7ebc2b14bc3fbda2b9af) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c index d49de4905efa4..4ef00b1f1cda4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c @@ -3682,6 +3682,11 @@ static int vmw_cmd_check(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, cmd_id = header->id; + if (header->size > SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE) { + VMW_DEBUG_USER("SVGA3D command: %d is too big.\n", + cmd_id + SVGA_3D_CMD_BASE); + return -E2BIG; + } *size = header->size + sizeof(SVGA3dCmdHeader); cmd_id -= SVGA_3D_CMD_BASE;