KRAM - Proposed grammar fixes

[mhailstone]

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/kram.md?plain=1

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Whereas with KERI rotation is happens automatically with a rotation event that is verified with the pre-rotated keys.

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Whereas with KERI rotation happens automatically with a rotation event that is verified with the pre-rotated keys.

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using FIDO2/WebAuthn to authentical replay requests would be going backwards.

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using FIDO2/WebAuthn to authenticate replay requests would be going backwards.

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A digital signature made with an assymmetric key pair(s) on a request provides non-repudiable authentication of the requester as the controller of that key pair(s).

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A digital signature made with an asymmetric key pair(s) on a request provides non-repudiable authentication of the requestor as the controller of that key pair(s).

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The datetime stamp should have fine enough resolution that the monotonicity constraint doesn not limit the rate of requests nor cause it to run past the end of the timeliness window.

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The datetime stamp should have fine enough resolution that the monotonicity constraint does not limit the rate of requests nor cause it to run past the end of the timeliness window.

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But even then its still best practice to have a timeout on the authentication because an attacker that intercepts the traffic can still replay the challenge response unless the requestee enforces one and only one reply per request.

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But even then it's still best practice to have a timeout on the authentication because an attacker that intercepts the traffic can still replay the challenge response unless the requestee enforces one and only one reply per request.

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The attacker can forward the reply to the requestor to hide the facy that it has intercepted the response and reply as a MITM.

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The attacker can forward the reply to the requestor to hide the fact that it has intercepted the response and reply as a MITM.

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But today where we assume a KERI context, we can already assume CSPRNGs, assymetric digital signatures tied to keystate of AIDs, cryptographic strength hashes, salty nonces, robust ubiquitous access to network time servers and a requirement to work over asynchronous public networks.

to
But today where we assume a KERI context, we can already assume CSPRNGs, asymetric digital signatures tied to keystate of AIDs, cryptographic strength hashes, salty nonces, robust ubiquitous access to network time servers and a requirement to work over asynchronous public networks.